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The Market for Property Rights in Water
TIMOTHY D. TREGARTHEN*
The market for any good or service will operate more or less
efficiently depending on the structural characteristics of the
market, the adequacy of the definition of the property rights
being exchanged, the availability of information, and the cost
of bargaining and reaching agreements among interested par-
ties. Water, despite frequent allegations that it is somehow
wholly unlike all other goods, is no exception. The oft-cited
complaint that water flows uphill toward money not only fails
to reflect the gravity of the situation, but raises what is in many
cases a non-problem. Under certain conditions, the flow of
water toward money is a perfectly desirable result. This paper
examines those conditions and suggests changes in existing
legal approaches to the problem of water allocation.
I. THE ROLE OF PROPERTY RIGHTS IN THE MARKETPLACE
The function of defined rights in property is perhaps best
understood by considering the consequences of their absence.
All the goods would, in effect, be "owned" in common. As a
result, there would be no incentive to economize on the use of
any good, to maintain the condition of the good, or to engage
in investment to improve it or increase its quantity. The bene-
fits of productive activity could not be appropriated by any
agent in the economy; little productive activity would result.
The absence of clearly defined property rights would assure a
large scale and continuing tragedy of the commons.
The economic problem is fundamentally one of choice;
alternative uses exist for virtually all goods and services, re-
quiring that decisions be made to select from among these
alternatives. Well defined rights give decision makers in the
economy a guide as to what they can reasonably expect of
others. If rights to the use of a particular asset clearly rest with
an individual, then the results of that individual's use of the
asset are internalized, forcing him or her to bear the costs and
benefits of decisions made concerning that use. Property rights
* B.A., 1967, California State University; M.A., 1970, Ph.D., 1972, University of
California at Davis. Associate Professor of Economics, University of Colorado, Colo-
rado Springs. I am grateful to participants of the Water Needs for the Future Confer-
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thus seek to internalize what would otherwise be externalities.,
To be complete, this internalization must involve the exclusion
of all other parties from the use of the right, and these parties
must be unaffected by that individual's use. Where the use is
collective in nature, as in the enjoyment of a beautiful stream,
it may be appropriate to define exclusive ownership to some
collection of individuals, represented perhaps by a government
agency. Thus exclusive ownership may rest with a single indi-
vidual or with an agent representing several individuals. The
important thing is that rights to the use of a good or service rest
exclusively with agents affected by that use.'
Once defined, property rights to the use of a good or service
must be enforceable; owners must have the ability to seek relief
for any violation of the rights owned.3 Finally, ownership of the
rights to the use of any good or service should include the rights
to appropriate returns from this and to transfer ownership
rights for a price.'
The marketplace in which rights are to be exchanged
should ideally be characterized by large numbers of buyers and
sellers for rights to each good and service. Potential sellers
should have ready access to each market, and information
should be readily available concerning the terms at which
rights are being sought and offered for sale. Bargaining costs
should be low enough to assure that all parties with an interest
in an exchange can participate in it. The satisfaction of these
conditions should assure an efficient allocation of resources.
Unhappily, one or more of these conditions is typically not met;
the marketplace of the real world is an imperfect mechanism
for allocating society's goods and services.
The market, whatever its imperfections, should serve in a
rough way to face decision makers with the full costs and bene-
fits of their decisions. Bids by buyers of a good generate price
information about the benefits of using resources for the pro-
1. Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57 AM. ECON. REV. 347, 350
(1967).
2. Cheung, The Structure of a Contract and the Theory of a Non-Exclusive
Resource, in THE ECONOMICS OF PROPERTY RIGHTS 27 (E. Furubotn & S. Pejovich eds.
1974).
3. C. STONE, SHOuLD TREES HAVE STANDING? TOWARD LEGAL RIGHTS FOR NATURAL
OBJECTS 11 (1974).
4. Cheung, supra note 2.
VOL. 6:363
THE MARKET FOR WATER
duction of that good; bids by producers of other goods for those
same resources generate price information about its cost.
Where exclusion is not complete, the information provided by
prices will be incorrect. If, for example, all beneficiaries of a
beautiful stream are not excluded from enjoying it if they do
not pay for it, prices will not reflect the value of the stream as
an aesthetic or recreational resource. If potential bidders are
left out of the exchange process because of inadequate informa-
tion, prices will again provide incorrect signals. Markets domi-
nated by a single seller (monopoly) or by a single buyer (mon-
opsony) will generate prices which give, respectively, artifi-
cially high and low signals via the price mechanism. But if the
market is working well, it will continuously generate valuable
information in the form of prices, information which should
guide resources toward their fabled "best use."
This notion of the ideal solution of a market model re-
quires some cautions. First, the notion of "best" rests on each
individual's perception of his or her own welfare. It is an axiom
of economic analysis that individuals can and do make choices
that they assume will make them better off. The added asser-
tion that these individuals are the best judges of what is best
for each of them is itself a value judgment for which there is
no scientific foundation.' It is, however, a value judgment to
which most economists, including this one, subscribe. If one
assumes that individuals are incapable of making choices in
their own interest, then one is left with the perplexing problem
of deciding who is able to make such choices for them.
The second problem of this model is the role of uncer-
tainty. All choices must be made on the basis of expectations
about the future; the benefits of an activity can only be guessed
at before it is undertaken. The benefits of activities foregone
for the activity chosen will never be known. It is not surprising
that individuals often make choices that seem, in retrospect,
to have been wrong. This problem is solved in much of eco-
nomic analysis by assuming perfect certainty and, thus, the
absence of error. It is a useful assumption; uncertainty is a
mathematically messy addition to most economic analyses.
The fact that uncertainty cannot be assumed away in the real
5. See, e.g., J. QUIRK, INTERMEDIATE MICROECONOMICS 59-60 (1976).
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world does not by itself prove that individual choice must be
abandoned; one would have to demonstrate that other mecha-
nisms deal better with uncertainty. An important feature of a
reasonably well-working marketplace is that it at least provides
the incentive to make correct decisions. Mistakes will be made,
but decision makers will presumably learn from such errors and
attempt to avoid them in the future.
The notion of a "best," or "optimal" allocation of goods
and services is thus more the stuff of mathematical models
than of the real world. A more useful consideration by which
one might test the market's usefulness is to inquire whether it,
relative to other mechanisms for resource allocation that might
be considered, tends more consistently to provide incentives
that nudge decision makers along in the direction of improved
resource allocation. Competitive markets with well-defined
property rights, reasonably complete exclusion, and ready ac-
cess to the exchange process should serve this more modest
cause well.
II. THE INITIAL ALLOCATION OF RIGHTS IN WATER
A theory of the process by which rights are created has not
been developed.' In general, one would expect that those indi-
viduals who first needed a resource would simply start using it;
other users could be expected to do the same. As the demand
for the use of a resource increased to the point at which the use
of any one individual conflicted with that of another, i.e., the
resource was no longer a free good, exclusive property rights
would be defined. Riparian doctrine, which defines a sort of
collective ownership to rivers by owners of adjacent lands, rep-
resents a half step in this process. On the one hand, it imposes
exclusion of those who do not own adjacent land, but does not
define individual ownership of the water itself. It is an odd sort
of compromise, one that implies that water has become a
scarce good, but that treats it essentially as a free one.'
A clearer definition of rights has been achieved under the
doctrine of prior appropriation. This was simply the granting
6. One preliminary effort to assess the creation of rights in land is given in Ander-
son & Hill, The Evolution of Property Rights: A Study of the American West, 18 J.
LAW & ECON. 163 (1975).
7. G. RADOSEVICH, K. NOBE, D. ALLARDICE & C. KIRiWOOD, EVOLUTION AND ADMIN-
ISTRATION OF COLORADO WATER LAW: 1876-1976 at 16 (1976).
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of specific titles to rights in water on a first-come, first-served
basis. From the point of view of economic efficiency, this is an
adequate way to initiate a market in rights for water. A lottery
would also suffice. In either case, the initial allocation defines
a starting point from which exchange can take place. Rights
will, over time, be allocated to those users who place the high-
est value on them, providing that exchange is possible
Equity is also a relevant concern in the selection of a
method by which the initial allocation of water rights is to be
determined. The initial assignment of property rights, together
with initial endowments of abilities and interests, determines
the distribution of wealth in the economy. Rights to water use
represent valuable assets; it would not be unreasonable to base
their initial allocation on social goals with respect to the distri-
bution of wealth. On this criterion, it is not obvious that the
first-come, first-served approach of prior appropriation is of
particular merit.
But another form of definition of rights preceded most
grants to appropriators. States using prior appropriation doc-
trine typically asserted that the waters of the state were the
property of the state, or of the people of the state.' These rights
were then given to appropriators as they claimed them. This
public largesse was impressive as well as surprising; it is not
at all clear that gifts to first takers represent the most equitable
means of transferring property from the public to the private
sector.'0 The question is of more than historical interest. The
public sector, by transferring wealth from itself on behalf of all
individuals to a few individuals, has weakened its ability to
reenter the market for water rights to buy back rights needed
8. Costly transactions may suggest an advantage for prior appropriations because
this approach may reduce the number of future transactions needed to allocate the
water rights. See R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW (1973).
9. COLO. CONST., art. 16, §5 states:
The water of every natural stream, not heretofore appropriated, within
the state of Colorado, is hereby declared to be the property of the public,
and the same is dedicated to the use of the people of the state, subject to
appropriation as hereinafter provided.
10. N. Wollman argues that states should make use of the price mechanism by
selling rights to the highest bidder. See Wollman, Economic Factors in the Study of
Water Use, in THE LAW OF WATER ALLOCATION IN THE EASTERN UNITED STATES 565 (D.
Haber & S. Bergen eds. 1958); for a differing view see Trelease, Policies for Water Lau:
Property Rights, Economic Forces, and Public Regulation, 5 NAT. Ras. J. 1, 10 (1965).
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for public use, as discussed below. To the extent that unappro-
priated rights remain, states should consider selling them
rather than giving them away. The question is one of equity
rather than efficiency, but equity is not an unimportant consid-
eration in the allocation of goods and services.
III. BENEFICIAL USE AND THE SECURITY OF RIGHTS IN WATER
Status as the first claimant of a right under prior appropri-
ation is (usually) a necessary but not sufficient condition to
assure title to a right to use water." The water claimed must
be put to a beneficial use, a curious qualification that suggests
all manner of limitations on rights in water. Some of these are
indicated in the following excerpt from a Nevada case, Union
Mill & Mining Co. v. Dangberg:'2
Under the principles of prior appropriation, the law is well settled
that the right to water flowing in the public streams may be
acquired by an actual appropriation of the water for a beneficial
use; that, if it is used for irrigation, the appropriator is only
entitled to the amount of water that is necessary to irrigate his
land, by making a reasonable use of the water; that the object
had in view at the time of the appropriation and diversion of the
water is to be considered in connection with the extent and right
of appropriation; that if the capacity of the flume, ditch, canal,
or other aqueduct, by means of which the water is conducted, is
of greater capacity than is necessary to irrigate the lands of the
appropriator, he will be restricted to the quantity of water needed
for the purposes of irrigation, for watering his stock, and for do-
mestic use; that the same rule applies to an appropriation made
for any other beneficial use or purpose; that no person can, by
virtue of his appropriation, acquire a right to any more water
than is necessary for the purpose of his appropriation; that, if the
water is used for the purpose of irrigating lands owned by the
appropriator, the right is not confined to the amount of water
used at the time the appropriation is made; the appropriator is
entitled, not only to his needs and necessities at that time, but
to such other and further amount of water, within the capacity
of his ditch, as would be required for the future improvement and
extended cultivation of his lands, if the right is otherwise kept up
A water right must thus be used for purposes that are beneficial
in nature and suitable for the purpose in amount. The right can
11. See G. RADOSEVICH, supra note 7, at 20.
12. 81 F. 73, 94 (C.C. Nev. 1897); quoted in G. RADOSEVICH, supra note 7, at 22-
VOL. 6:363
THE MARKET FOR WATER
exceed present use if justified by the prospect of expanded
operations, at least in agriculture. While the general nature of
non-beneficial uses is unclear, rights can be forfeited in the
event of non-use.' 3 Existing legislation provides for the discon-
tinuance of any diversion within a designated groundwater
basin if the rights are no longer necessary for a beneficial use.'4
In a world of freely exchanging rights in water, the doctrine
of beneficial use would, of course, be unnecessary. Water use
would be allocated to uses judged beneficial by the market.
Non-use would not be a problem; owners of rights would have
nothing to gain by holding them idle when they could be sold.'"
To be sure, the market's estimate of beneficial use might differ
from that of the public, or its legislature. Some might, for
example, object to the use of water in the washroom of a porno-
graphic theatre. But the solution to such a problem is surely
to regulate the theatre rather than shutting off its water.
If the beneficial use doctrine were merely unnecessary,
there would be no particular cause for concern. It would serve
as an amusing example of an eccentricity in the law, and noth-
ing more. But the doctrine of beneficial use may be harmful,
and thus warrants further examination. As noted above, rights
in property must be enforceable if the market is to work pro-
perly; the absence of enforcement would destroy the market for
rights. One usually thinks of this requirement in terms of pro-
tection from thieves and frauds. But, as Ciriacy-Wantrup has
pointed out, security of rights requires more than the protec-
tion against unlawful use by others. It also requires tenure
certainty, i.e., protection from encroachment by the legal acts
of others.'" The doctrine of beneficial use, with its implications
of judicial determination of need and non-use, in effect in-
creases the uncertainty of title to rights in water, and therefore
reduces their marketability. As Trelease has noted, the flexibil-
13. See Wheeler v. Northern Colo. Irrigation Co., 10 Colo. 582, 17 P. 487 (1887).
14. See, e.g., Water Rights Determination and Administration Act of 1969, CoLO.
REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 37-92-101 et seq. (1973); especially §37-92-502(2).
15. An appropriator might find it desirable to hold rights idle temporarily; an
efficient market would provide such an owner the opportunity to rent out rights not
currently needed, as suggested below.
16. Ciriacy-Wantrup, Concepts used as Economic Criteria for a System of Water
Rights, 32 LAND ECON. 295, 297 (1956).
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ity of use in water rights is best assured by making those rights
as rigid and clear as possible, thus making exchange easier.'7
A classic example of the judicial mischief to which the
doctrine of beneficial use can lead is the ruling in Young v.
Hinderlider. '9 Hinderlider had made first application for cer-
tain water rights in New Mexico, intending to market the water
to a number of farms. Young and Norton filed an application
for the same water two months later, proposing to use the water
to irrigate their own farm at a substantially lower cost per acre
than that anticipated by Hinderlider. The District Court
awarded the rights to Hindelider on grounds that he had ap-
plied first. The Supreme Court, however, developed an interest
in the economics of the problem, ruling that "[t]he mere fact
that the irrigation under the [Hinderlider] project would cost
more per acre than under the [Young and Norton] project is
not conclusive that the former project should be rejected. But
the attempt to cover too much land may have gone so far that
the cost of irrigation under that project would be so excessive
that the owners of land under the project could not pay the
water rights and farm the lands at a profit."' 9 It ordered the
District Court to reconsider which proposal suggested the more
beneficial use on this basis. It is an intriguing exercise to con-
sider the effects of such reasoning were it applied to the acquis-
ition of property rights for all other forms of investment.
The doctrine of preferential use is similar in spirit to the
beneficial use doctrine in that it imposes a non-market test of
priorities in rights. In its most common form, the doctrine
holds that domestic uses of water have priority over agricul-
tural uses, which in turn have priority over manufacturing
uses. The notion is quite silly. All economic activity is ulti-
mately for domestic use, that is, consumption. The eating of
food off of a manufactured plate does not seem greatly less
domestic than washing the plate afterwards. The purpose of
the priority structure imposed by this doctrine is to permit
preferred uses to exercise powers of eminent domain in the
17. Trelease, A Model State Water Code for River Basin Development, 22 LAW
& CONTEMP. PRoB. 301, 314 (1957); see also J. HIRSCHLEIWER, J. DEHAVEN & J. MILLIMAN,
WATER SUPPLY (1969).
18. 15 N.M. 666, 110 P. 1045 (1910).
19. 110 P. 1045, 1050 (1910).
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acquisition of water rights.2 " The justification for such a provi-
sion is not apparent. As noted below, monopoly power is more
likely to rest with municipal buyers than with sellers in the
market for water; granting buyers additional power does not
seem necessary.
IV. LIMITS ON THE TRANSFERABILITY OF WATER RIGHTS
Rights to water are typically expressed in terms of a rate
of diversion at a specific point. Holders of rights do not own
water that they return to the stream after they have used the
rights. This definition results in two major sets of difficulties.
First, it reduces the ability of the market to generate incentives
to economize on the consumptive use of watery.2 Second, it
reduces the marketability of the rights.
If rights to divert water implied full ownership of the
water, then holders of these rights could sell "leftover" water
to other users. This would force these owners to face the oppor-
tunity cost of wasting water. Users of irrigation water would,
for example, have a greater incentive to line and cover ditches
if water not consumed could be resold. The concern of the
National Water Commission, that "[u]sers of water, public or
private, are now typically awarded the right to divert and use
water free of charge and need to give no heed to values that
some other use of the water might yield," would be
eliminated. 2 Some incentive to economize exists now, given
that conservation measures can reduce the amount of water a
user needs to divert, and thus allows that owner to sell some
of his rights. Increasing the marketability of these rights by
providing for a resale market for water recharged to the stream
would increase the force of this incentive.
Because water rights are really rights to divert water for
some use, the courts have imposed limitations on their sale
when that sale involves a change in use. Agricultural rights in
water, for example, involve a decreed right to divert a specific
volume of water per unit of time. The citation from the Union
Mill & Mining case quoted above suggests that the decreed
right can exceed present use to the extent that expanded agri-
20. G. RADOSEVICH, supra note 7, at 64-65.
21. Trelease, supra note 10, at 27.
22. NATIONAL WATER COMMISSION, WATER POLICIES FOR THE FUTURE 251 (1973).
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cultural operations are planned for the future. The greater the
volume of water decreed, the greater the value of the right.
When such rights are sold for domestic use, however, the na-
ture of the right is changed. Because domestic use typically
involves a continuous diversion of water and a greater degree
of consumptive use, the full amount of water decreed to agri-
cultural users cannot generally be sold. Instead, sales are lim-
ited to the amount of historical use, which must in addition be
reasonable .3 These rulings suggest that the volume of water
implied by the right changes if the use changes, thus limiting
the incentive for rights to transfer to what may be a more
efficient use. Recognizing rights as decreed, and permitting the
resale of water not used, would take care of the problem of
incentives to conserve water as well as providing for the easy
exchange of water among users.
Another legal limitation on the transferability of rights is
the ban on the sale of rights to waters in one state to agents in
other states.24 This ban reduces the market's ability to commu-
nicate, through the price system, alternative needs for water.
It also exacerbates a structural difficulty noted above. Interba-
sin transfers of water are characterized by the enormity of the
scale with which they are carried out.2 It is unlikely that within
a state like Colorado there would be very many buyers able to
build a large interbasin diversion project. This limits the num-
ber of domestic bidders for water in remote areas, thus result-
ing in possible monopoly power on the buyer's side, or monop-
sony. Monopsony power permits buyers to pay a price below
the price that would exist in a competitive market. Eliminating
competing purchasers from other states strengthens the bar-
gaining power of local domestic buyers. As noted above, grant-
ing them powers of eminent domain makes things even worse.
23. In Farmers' Highline Canal & Reservoir Co. v. City of Golden, 129 Colo. 575,
272 P.2d 629 (1954), the court held that the amount of water claimed as historical
agricultural use was excessive, and noted that the testimony of "any capable
experienced farmer" could be used to determine a reasonable amount, which, in turn,
would define the amount that could be sold for domestic use. See also Enlarged South-
side Irrigation Ditch Co. v. John's Flood Ditch Co., 116 Colo. 580, 183 P.2d 552 (1947);
City of Westminster v. Church, 167 Colo. 1, 445 P.2d 52 (1968).
24. J. HIRCHLEIFER, supra note 17, at 242.
25. C. HOWE & K. EASTER, INTERBASIN TRANSFERS OF WATER 4-5 (1971).
VOL. 6:363
THE MARKET FOR WATER
V. MARKET FAILURE AND WATER RIGHTS
The discussion to this point has dealt with market prob-
lems in the exchange of water rights that result from public
policy. But there are other difficulties inherent in the market
process itself, difficulties that emerge when it is not possible to
define property rights in a way that forces the market to incor-
porate all of the costs and benefits of decisions into the choice
perspectives of the individuals making those decisions.
Some uses of water are not susceptible to easy exclusion
of individuals that do not pay for them; a beautiful stream may
be a difficult thing to price in the market. The benefits derived
from the stream are no less economic as a result; the prices
generated in the market will simply fail to reflect them'ade-
quately. The result will be too few unspoiled streams. In such
cases, public purchase of water rights to preserve the streams
may be justified. If the rights are already held by the public,
the decision would involve a comparison of the public benefits
of leaving the stream in its natural state with the bids offered
for private purchase of the rights. The problem is the classic
one of the public good.
A related objection to the market's allocation of water is
the prospect that domestic users would be able to buy up all
of the rights in water for irrigated agriculture. The fear is rather
fanciful; water for irrigation accounts for such a high percen-
tage of all water used that a relatively small percentage reduc-
tion in agricultural use would provide for a tremendous in-
crease in residential or industrial use. In any event, if some
diversion of water from agricultural use is expected, the prob-
lem is to determine whether such a market-induced diversion
is undesirable. Food is not a public good; there is no problem
there. But agricultural operations provide another service that
has value; fields devoted to crops provide open space, which
yields aesthetic benefits as well as flood control and reduced air
pollution. The field that produces food thus produces other
benefits at the same time. These other benefits are not charac-
terized by exclusion; the price system therefore fails to reflect
them. Farmers are thus forced to bid for factors of production,
like water, with the deck stacked somewhat against them. If
these public benefits are to be recognized, however, they sug-
gest a payment to farmers for the open space benefits of their
agricultural operations, not the provision of cheap water. The
1976
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latter approach makes no more sense than decreeing that farm
workers should receive a low wage to encourage agricultural
operations. Keeping the price of any factor artificially low re-
sults in the waste and inefficient allocation of that factor."
VI. TOWARD GREATER EFFICIENCY IN WATER MARKETS
A smoothly functioning market for rights in water would
result in the easy exchange of water among agents and among
uses, resulting in greater efficiency. Owners of water rights
would continually be faced with bids reflecting the cost of their
use of the rights; they would be induced in their own interest
to economize on their use of water, and to sell their rights if
some other agent placed a higher value on them. But observers
of the water market commonly note that it does not work that
way. The fact that water rights for agricultural uses sell for
prices much lower than equivalent rights for other uses is evi-
dence that the market does not work as smoothly as suggested
here. This essay has explored some of the reasons for those
rigidities; many of them can be eliminated by changing public
policy.
But an added difficulty arises from the rather complex
nature of water as a fluid resource. Rights in water are harder
to define and to observe than, say, rights in basketballs. Pur-
chasers and sellers of water rights face high information costs
in determining which rights are available for sale and who may
be buying them. Tracing the title to a water right is a compli-
cated business. The authority of state water engineers and
water allocation boards can be of great significance in dealing
with these problems. If these agencies were to focus all their
efforts on the problem of providing information about the
rights owned in water, they would be providing a great service.
Investment in information and the smooth functioning of the
marketplace in water may yield benefits far greater than those
of new water projects. 7
As information systems in water allocation improve, there
is reason to believe that a variety of new methods of exchanging
26. Nancy L. Sidener has suggested that provision of cheap agricultural water
could even be construed as a violation of the prohibition of subsidies to export indus-
tries in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade.
27. See Null, Water Use as a Property Right, 22 THE COLORADO QUARTERLY 317,
326 (1974).
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rights might emerge. Rights could be leased from owners for
short periods. Problems of temporary shortage, such as
drought, could be dealt with through such lease arrangements.
Associated problems of uncertainty might generate the same
response in the water market that they have in other markets,
the creation of futures markets. It may become commonplace
in the future to hear December quotes on July South Platte
water. Water brokers might increase in number.
The market is no panacea. As has been noted above, pub-
lic intervention will be required to deal with public goods-and
public bads, such as pollution. But the market for any good has
the enormous virtue of generating large amounts of informa-
tion, transmitting this information in the form of prices, and
through these prices prodding decision makers in the direction
of more efficient use of scarce resources. It has been insuffi-
ciently used in the allocation of water; investment in its in-
creased use should be a high priority of water policy.

